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TORT-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-FEP.'s

DOCTRINE

BARS POST-DISCHARGE

Laswell v.

FAILURE TO WARN

CLAIM.

Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982).
Charles Laswell was a soldier in the United States Army in
1947 and 1948. During this time, Laswell participated in three nuclear weapons tests in the Marshall Islands. Laswell and the other
participants observed each explosion from nearby ships. After the
third blast, Laswell helped build a landing strip approximately one
mile from the blast site.
In January 1975, Laswell learned he had Hodgkins disease, a
form of cancer that attacks the lymph glands. The plaintiffs, Laswell's widow and their three children, contended the exposure to
radiation in 1947 and 1948 caused Laswell's cancer. In addition, the
plaintiffs contended the cancer and its treatment caused the massive
coronary infarction which resulted in Laswell's death on September
1, 1979.
The plaintiffs filed suit against the United States and certain
named individuals for damages resulting from the disability and
death of Laswell. The children also sought recovery for their increased risk of genetic damage. The complaint stated four causes of
action.' The first, grounded on the fifth amendment, alleged that
Laswell, without his knowledge, was made the subject of an experiment "to determine how well combat troops could physically and
psychologically withstand atomic blasts and the subsequent radioactivity." 2 The second cause of action, also grounded on the fifth
amendment, alleged that the defendants failed to warn Laswell of
the health dangers he and his progeny faced and failed to provide
preventive treatment. The third and fourth causes of action were
based on allegations of negligence.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 3 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded the exercise of jurisdiction. Laswell v.
Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982).
1. Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1205

(1983).
2. Id.
3. Laswell v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
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The concept of sovereign immunity has its roots in early common law4 where it developed as an outgrowth of the political and
social structure of feudal England.' By the middle of the thirteenth
century it was settled doctrine that the King could not be sued in his
own courts.6
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was justified by the concept of rex gratiadei, or King by the grace of God.7 This concept,
supported by the King and the Church, was based on the conceit
that the King was ordained by God and, as ultimate secular authority, was answerable only to God.8
Sovereign immunity, however, did not completely preclude recovery from the Crown. 9 A request to waive immunity-the petition of right--developed into a regular procedure for obtaining
relief from the Crown.' 0 In addition, a statutory remedy, monstrans
de droit," developed in the fourteenth century.12 Although only
available in certain land title cases, monstrans de droit became the
most frequently used procedure for obtaining relief from the Crown
4. Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers.- Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1963). For the suggestion that the doctrine has its roots in Roman law, see Parker,
The King Does No Wrong-Liabilityfor Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1952).
5. L. HURWITZ, THE STATE As DEFENDANT: GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE REDRESS OF INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCES, 3-28 (1981). See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3-8 (3d ed. 1944); Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the
FederalGovernment, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 722 (1947). William the conqueror's barons established manorial courts in which the barons, by virtue of their lordship, exercised jurisdiction
over their vassals. A baron was immune from suit in his own court. He was, however,
subject to the jurisdiction of his own lord's court and, ultimately, the King's courts. The
King, at the apex of the feudal pyramid, enjoyed a broad immunity. See generally L. HURwiTz, supra, at 3-28; W. STUBBS, Early JudicialSystems, in LECTURES ON EARLY ENGLISH
HISTORY (A. Hassall ed. 1906).
6. Jaffee, supra note 4, at 3.
7. L. HURWITZ, supra note 5, at 12-20. See also Gellhorn & Schenck, supra note 5, at
722.
8. See L. HURWITZ, supra note 5, at 12-20.
9. See generally 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254-57; C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 5-8 (1972); 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
5, at 7-45; Jaffee, supra note 4, at 5-15.
10. The petition of right developed out of practices in the reign of Edward I (12721307). It was a complicated and expensive procedure. For a general discussion, see 9 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 13-22. Consent to maintain the suit was given by the
Crown's endorsement of the petition. Once the petition was endorsed, the claim against the
sovereign was disposed of in accordance with the substantive law, "as in suits between subject and subject." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 256.
11. Le., "manifestation of right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
12. 34 Edw. III. ch. 14; 36 Edw. II ch. 13, cited in 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at
25 nn.2 & 3. See also 2 & 3 Edw. VI. ch. 8 (expanding the remedy), cited in 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 26 n.2.
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3
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.'
If, as suggested, the structure of feudal government and the
concept of rex gratiadei led to the development of sovereign immunity, the seventeenth century witnessed an end to the existing rationales for the doctrine. A civil war, 14 the execution of a king,15 a
brief attempt to establish a republican government, 16 and a blood-8
less revolution 7 firmly established the ascendancy of Parliament.'
Any pretensions of absolutism and any claims of rule by divine right
were quashed.19
Although the conditions that gave birth to the doctrine of sovereign immunity changed, the doctrine itself maintained a vigorous
existence. However, the doctrine was modified to meet economic
changes brought about by an increase in commerce and industry. In
1860, courts of ordinary jurisdiction were given the authority to hear
petitions of right as a matter of course.20 In 1874, the Queen's
Bench held that a petition of right was appropriate for breach of
13. See generally 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 25-28. Monstrans de droil, like
the petition of right, was prosecuted in chancery. In the seventeenth century, however, the
court of Exchequer began playing an active role in the adjudication of property rights involving the sovereign. E.g, Pawlett v. Attorney Gen., Hardres 465, 145 Eng. Rep. 550, 552
(Ex. 1668) (Th Exchequer granted an equity of redemption on land that had escheated to the
Crown. "[I]t would derogate from the King's honour to imagine, that what is equity against
a common person, should not be equity against him."); The Case of the Bankers in the Court
of Exchequer, (1690-1700) collected in 4 T.B. HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 1-114 (1812) (enforcing payment of grants made by Charles II). See also Jaffee, supra note 4, at 6-9.
14. The English Revolution (1640-1660) began as a conflict between Charles I and Parliament. Both sides fielded an army and Charles was soundly defeated. Parliament, however, lost control of the government to the army and Oliver Cromwell. After Cromwell's
death, Parliament restored the Crown to Charles II in 1660. See generally infra note 17.
15. On January 30, 1649, Charles I was executed by the army for treason. See generally
infra note 17.
16. After the execution of Charles I, Cromwell attempted to establish a republican government. This attempt, however, merely masked control by the army. In 1653, dissatisfied
with the progress of reforms, Cromwell formally took the reins of government as Lord Protector of England. See generally infra note 17.
17. In 1688, Parliament again clashed with the King, James II, a Catholic. James' eldest daughter, Mary, a Protestant, and her husband, William of Orange, were invited to bring
an army to England. James fled without a fight and Parliament settled the Crown on William and Mary. See generally infra note 17.
18. For a summary of English history in the 17th century, see 1 C. ROBERTS & D.
ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 325-440 (1980); C. FRIEDRICH & C. BLITZER, THE AGE
OF POWER 119-49 (1957).
19. Philosophically, the century saw a renewed interest in the function and form of
government. The view of government as a "social contract" between the governors and the
governed was introduced. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT (1698).
20. Petitions of Right Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict., ch. 34, § 2 (repealed), cited in Jaffee,
supra note 4, at 8 n.20.
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contract by the Crown.21 In the field of tort law, however, sovereign
immunity remained a bar to relief. In 1865, the Queen's Bench held
that a petition of right did not lie for a tort committed by a servant
or agent of the Crown.22
In addition to a direct remedy against the Crown, individuals
had the option of bringing an action against an officer of the Crown.
Local officials could be sued at common law without the consent of
the Crown.2 3

Sovereign immunity became an issue in the courts of the
United States in 1793 with Chisholm v. Georgia,24 a case in which
the Supreme Court held that a state could be sued by a citizen of
another state. The Court based its holding on article III, section 2 of
the United States Constitution, which extends the judicial power of
the United States to "[c]ontroversies between a State and Citizens of
another State." The State of Georgia argued that this grant of
power was impliedly qualified by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Chisholm was effectively overruled by the rapid ratification of
the eleventh amendment. 25 Thereafter, the eleventh amendment
the states in
and sovereign immunity were continually asserted by
26
courts.
federal
the
of
jurisdiction
the
efforts to limit
21. Thomas v. The Queen, 10 Q.B. 31 (1874).
22. Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 257, 295, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1205 (Q.B. 1865)
(reasoning that since the King can do no wrong, he can not authorize wrong). For a criticism of the case, see 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 43-44.
23. See generally Jaffee, supra note 4, at 9-16. These officers were, however, subject to
the direct control of the Privy Council. As a result, the Crown could remove such proceedings from the regular courts into the Privy Council. Such removals undoubtedly increased
the tension between the courts, the Crown and Parliament over the independence of the
judiciary and contributed to the constitutional upheavals of the seventeenth century. The
great number of suits against Crown officers in the early seventeenth century is indicated by
a statute of James I which provided that a losing plaintiff would pay double costs in suits
against certain officers. Public Officers Protection Act, 1609, 7 Jac. 1, ch. 5 (repealed), cited
in Jaffee, supra note 4, at 10 n.28. After the Glorious Revolution (1688-1689), the common
law action against Crown officers continued to be used, but without interference from the
Privy Council. Jaffee, supra note 4, at 13. See, e.g., Ashby v. White, 6 Mod. 45, 87 Eng.
Rep. 808 (Q.B. 1702), rev'd, 1 Brown P.C. 45, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (H.L: 1703) (suit against an
election officer for the corrupt rejection of a vote in a parliamentary election).
24. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
25. The 11th amendment was ratified in 1798. It provides that the "]udicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." The reason for the swift ratification of the 11 th amendment
has been the subject of some disagreement. One view is that the amendment resulted from
the financial instability of the states following the war. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821); Gellhorn & Schenck, supra note 5, at 722. But see C. JACOBS,
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMuNITY 4 (1972).
26. E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); United States v. Peters, 9
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Sovereign immunity was also asserted on behalf of the United
States.2 7 As the courts applied the doctrine, two corollaries devel-

oped.2 8 First, only Congress may waive the immunity of the United
States.2 9 Second, legislative enactments which grant a waiver of
sovereign immunity should be strictly construed.30
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been vigorously applied by the courts of the United States. 3 1 However, the courts have
seldom analyzed the reasons for its adoption and continued application.3 2 The doctrine, even in the earliest references, is generally
cited simply as "settled. ' '33 Three basic rationalizations for sovereign immunity have appeared, however.34 A historical rationale was
the first. 35 This rationale stresses the sovereign immunity doctrine's
firm entrenchment in the common law and emphasizes the position
of the United States as the successor to the attributes of sovereignty
possessed by the English monarchy.
Later, Justice Davis voiced a public policy rationale for the
doctrine. 36 "The principle [of sovereign immunity] is fundamental,
applies to every sovereign power, and but for the protection it affords, the government would be unable to perform the various duties for which it was created. 37
Lastly, a conceptual rationale for the doctrine was advanced by
Justice Holmes.38
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immuU.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).

See generaly C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972).

27. Eg., Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272
(1850); United States v. McLemore 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
28. 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 51 (1964).

29. E.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); Munro v. United States, 303 U.S.
36 (1938); Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227
(1887); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850).
30. Eg., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 495 (1940); Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373 (1899); Schillinger v. United States, 155
U.S. 163 (1894).

31. Eg. , cases cited supra note 26.
32. See C. JAcoBs, supra note 25, at 150-64. Jacobs expresses some doubt as to whether
the doctrine of sovereign immunity should have been recognized as part of the common law
heritage of the United States. He also suggests that the doctrine may conflict with due process requirements. See also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208-09 (1882).
33. Eg., cases cited supra note 26.
34. C. JACOBS, supra note 25, at 150.
35. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 435 (1793).
36. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122 (1868).
37. Id. at 126.
38. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
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nity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission,
but the answer has been public property since before the day of
Hobbes. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.3 9

The first broad waiver of sovereign immunity was the establishment of the Court of Claims by Congress.' This waiver did not
reach tort claims, however, and in 1868, the Supreme Court held
that the sovereign remained immune from suit in tort.4 ' In 1887, the
42
Tucker Act expanded the claims jurisdiction of the federal courts,
but, again, suits sounding in tort were excluded.43
It was not until 1946 that Congress enacted the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA)44 which created a broad waiver of immunity in
tort actions against the United States. 45 The FTCA was enacted for
two basic purposes. 46 The first was to relieve Congress of the overwhelming burden of private relief bills relating to tort claims. 47 The
second was to provide for the just adjudication of claims without
39. Id. at 353.

40. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. Congress conferred on the Court of
Claims jurisdiction to determine all claims based on a law of Congress, a regulation of an
executive department, or a contract with the United States. The decisions of the Court of
Claims, however, did not have the effect of a regular judicial determination, but were subject
to the approval of Congress. In 1863, the Court of Claims was reorganized and given the
power to enter final judgments, subject to a right of appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 91, 12 Stat. 765.
41. Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868).
42. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
The Tucker Act, among other things, granted the district courts jurisdiction concurrent with
the Court of Claims over claims not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976). Under
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 25, the Court of Claims was abolished
and its trial jurisdiction was absorbed by the new U.S. Claims Court.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
44. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976)).
45. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). But see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). In the
years preceding the enactment of the FTCA, Congress enacted a number of statutes which
provided limited remedies for torts in certain areas. See, e.g., Small Tort Claims Act, Pub.
L. No. 67-375, 42 Stat. 1066 (1922) (repealed); Suits in Admiralty Act, Pub. L. No. 66-156,
41 Stat. 525 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1976)); Patent Infringement Act, Pub. L. No.
65-305, 36 Stat. 851 (1910) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1976)).
46. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) (describing the then existing
system as unduly burdensome to Congress). See also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U.S. 543, 549 (1951); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
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depending on the "caprice. . . of individual private laws."4 8
The broad language of the FTCA granted the district courts
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.49
Congress did make specific exceptions to the application of the
FTCA.50 If a claim fell within one of these exceptions, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity would prevent the courts from exercising
jurisdiction.'
The structure of the FTCA indicated, to some extent, its application to military personnel. There was a clear indication that the
United States would sometimes answer for the negligence of military personnel. "Employee of the government" was defined by the
FTCA to include "members of the military or naval forces of the
United States."'5 2 In addition, "acting within the scope of his office
or employment, in the case of a member of the military or naval
forces of the United States, means acting in the line of duty."53
The FTCA, to a limited extent, covered claims of military personnel against the government. One indication of this coverage was
the fact that between 1925 and 1935, eighteen tort claims bills were
introduced in Congress and all but two expressly denied recovery to
members of the armed forces.54 The FTCA, as enacted, made no
similar exclusion. However, the FTCA specifically disallowed
claims arising out of "the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war."55 Also specifically disallowed are claims arising in a foreign country.56
The first claim by a serviceman under the FTCA to reach the
Supreme Court was Brooks v. United States . In Brooks, the Court
48. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).

49. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). In 1974, the FTCA was extended to cover intentional
torts of federal investigative or law enforcement officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
51. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30-31 (1953).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
53. Id.
54. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 nn.2-3 (1949).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1976).
57. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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held that a serviceman could recover against the United States
under the FTCA. The scope of the decision raised questions, however. The Court noted that the plaintiffs' accident had nothing to do
with their army career. "Were the accident incident to the Brooks'
service, a wholly different case would be presented."58
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue reserved in Brooks. 59 In Feres the Court held that "the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or in the course of activity
incident to service." 60 Feres created a judicial exception to the
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA.61
The Court based its decision in Feres on three major considerations. First, the Court noted the language of the FTCA which provided that the liability of the United States is to be the same as that
of a private individual under like circumstances. 62 Since private persons cannot conduct military activities, there would be no liability
of a private individual analogous to the three claims that were asserted in Feres. The Court concluded that, if allowed, such suits
would "visit the Government with novel and unprecedented
liabilities.

63

The second consideration emphasized by the Court was the distinctly federal character of the relationship between the Government and members of the armed forces. The FTCA provided that
the law of the place where the tort occurred was to govern. 64 The
Court felt that this was inappropriate in a relationship so distinctly
federal in nature. 65 Finally, the Court emphasized that there were
other "enactments by Congress which provide systems of simple,
58. Id. at 52.
59. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Feres was a consolidation of three cases. The Feres case in-

volved the death by fire of a serviceman on active duty. The fire was allegedly caused by a
defective heating plant. The Jefferson case involved the alleged negligence of an army surgeon who left a towel in a serviceman's stomach. The Griggs case also involved allegations
of medical malpractice by army surgeons.
60. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
61. Feres is the only clearly recognized judicial exception to the FTCA. But see Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952) (construing the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act (FECA), ch. 458, 39 Stat. 742 (1916) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.) as an exclusive remedy before the express provision making it the exclusive remedy
for the employees covered by the Act), cited in 2 L. JAYsON, supra note 27, at § 237 (discussion of the implied exclusions in the FTCA).
62. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
63. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
64. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
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certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in
the armed services. "66
Four years later the Court discussed another reason for the
holding in Feres: the disruptive effect such suits would have on military discipline. 67 Today, this is generally considered the primary
rationale for the Feres doctrine.68
In United States v. Brown69 the Supreme Court refined the distinction between Brooks and Feres. A veteran sought damages for
the negligent treatment of his knee in a Veterans Administration
Hospital. The original injury to the knee occurred while the veteran
was still on active duty. The Court held that such a suit could be
maintained, noting that the alleged negligence on which the suit was
based occurred after discharge.70 Brown has since become the main
support for claimants seeking to avoid the harsh application of the
Feres doctrine. 7
The Supreme Court has recently extended the scope of the
Feres doctrine to indemnity claims.72 The Court held in 1951 that
the United States could be sued under the FTCA for contribution or
indemnity; 3 but, in 1977, the Court, when faced with a claim for
indemnity by a third party for injury to a serviceman on active duty,
relied on Feres to bar the claim because the serviceman was injured
in the course of military service.74
The Feres "incident to service" test has not been construed by
the Supreme Court. The lower courts, however, have indicated a
number of factors to be considered in applying the test. These factors include whether or not the claimant 1) was on active duty;
66. Id. at 144.
67. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
68. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977); Hunt v.
United States, 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.
Pa. 1981); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA
Recovery?, 77 MicH. L. REV. 1099 (1979).
69. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
70. Id. at 112.
71. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 78.
72. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (manufacturer of a

malfunctioning ejection system in a fighter aircraft sought indemnity).
73. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
74. Stencel.4ero Eng'g Corp., 431 U.S. 666. Notwithstanding this reaffirmation of the
Feres doctrine, a number of lower courts have continued to express reservations about the
continued validity of Feres. Eg., Labash v. United States Dep't of the Army, 668 F.2d 1153
(10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982); United States v. Monaco, 661 F.2d 129
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2269 (1982); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007
(5th Cir. 1980); Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Note, From
Feres to Stencel, supra note 67.
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2) was injured on base; 3) was subject to military control at the time
of the injury; or 4) was involved in an activity related to or dependent on military status."

In recent years, a number of claims based on the FTCA have
arisen out of military activities that created long-term health
problems. A number of these claims were based on the claimant's
exposure to radiation while in service.76 Others were based on the
claimant's exposure to hazardous chemicals.77 Still others were
based on the military's experimentation with drugs.7 8 The success
of these claims varied. Generally, the claimants attempted to escape
the Feres doctrine by alleging a post-discharge negligent failure to
warn or offer preventive treatment.7 9

Based upon the reasoning of Brown, three federal courts have
recognized a claim for negligent post-discharge failure to warn a
veteran of the health consequences of an in-service act. 80 The first
75. See general, Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). For a
thorough analysis of the cases applying the incident to service test in a wide range of fact
patterns, see I L. JAYSON, supra note 27, at § 155.
76. Eg., Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3086 (1983), (exposure to radiation during work on the "Manhattan Project" caused
children's genetic damage); Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981) (participation in military exercises in the immediate vicinity of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in
Nevada caused cancer); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2269 (1982) (exposure to radiation in connection with the "Manhattan Project"
caused cancer and a birth defect); Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(exposure to radiation during the Navy's test of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific caused
cancer); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (participation in nuclear
weapons test in Nevada caused cancer).
77. E.g., Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (chemical
companies sought indemnification for damages resulting from the exposure of veterans to
herbicides in Vietnam); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980) (exposure to toxic gases during a Navy experiment).
78. E.g., Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (voluntary participant in a program intended to develop and test methods of defense against chemical warfare was given
LSD without his knowledge); Sweet v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 1068 (C.D.S.D. 1981)
(voluntary participant in chemical warfare experiments was given a chemical substance
which he claimed caused subsequent behavioral problems); Nagy v. United States, 471 F.
Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979) (participation in two LSD medical experiments conducted by the
Army); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (imprisoned serviceman
was given LSD without his knowledge in an experiment designed to test the ability of the
drug as an aid to interrogation).
79. E.g., Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Stanley v. CIA, 639
F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Sweet v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 1068 (C.D.S.D. 1981); Kelly
v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
80. Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Everett v. United States, 492
F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
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of these decisions was Thornwell v. United States.8 ' While in service, Thornwell was administered lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)
without his knowledge. The district court held that the Feres doctrine precluded recovery for any injury which occurred while
Thornwell was on active duty. The court concluded, however, that
the failure to warn or provide follow-up medical care was cognizable under Brown. The court emphasized the fact that the in-service
injury was intentional and that the post-service injury resulted from
negligence. This was emphasized despite the court's holding that
recovery for the in-service injury was barred no matter if the tort
was negligent, intentional, or constitutional. 82 Also, this fact pattern
appears irrelevant to a disposition of the post-discharge claim.8 3
The court was apparently emphasizing the fact that this was not "a
mere act of negligence which takes place while the plaintiff is on
active duty and which then remains uncorrected." 84
Subsequent to Thornwell, two other courts reached similar conclusions in suits based on a veteran's exposure to nuclear radiation
while on active duty.85 However, a number of other courts have
applied the Feres doctrine and dismissed post-discharge failure to
warn claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction.86 Generally, in
rejecting these claims, the courts have relied on two major considerations. First, the courts have expressed their concern that allowing
the maintainence of such suits would undermine the Feres doctrine.8 7 Second, the courts have relied on a conceptual argument in
rejecting the claims. 88 Basically, this argument is that any obligation to warn is inseparable from the source of that obligation, which
See also Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (dicta places an affirm-

ative duty on the government to warn of the health risks involved).
81. Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. 344.
82. Le., a Bivens-type action. See infra text accompanying notes 89-99.
83. See Brown, 348 U.S. 110.
84. Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 351. But cf.Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (involving the negligent reading of a service-

man's x-rays and a post-discharge failure to warn claim).
85. See Broudy v. United Sttes, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Everett v. United States,
492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
86. See Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct.
3086 (1983); Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Henning v. United States, 446
F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Sweet v. United States, 528 F.
Supp. 1068 (C.D.S.D. 1981); Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Schnurman v. United States,
490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980).
87. E.g.,Agent OrangeProd Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 779; Schnurman, 490 F. Supp.

at 437.
88. See, e.g., Stanley, 639 F.2d 1146; Kelly, 512 F. Supp. 356.
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would typically be an in-service injury. 89
In addition to seeking recovery under the FTCA, veterans who
have experienced long-term health problems as a result of their
service have also relied on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.9 In Bivens the Supreme Court
created a federal cause of action for damages for violations of the
fourth amendment9 by federal officials.92 Subsequently, the Court
implied a cause of action
under the fifth amendment 93 and under
94
the eighth amendment.
It is clear that a suit directly against the United States for the
violation of an individual's constitutional rights by federal officials
is barred by sovereign immunity.95 Suits against federal officers
may also be barred by sovereign immunity if the Feres doctrine is
applicable. The majority of courts that have decided the issue have
held that the Feres doctrine applies to Bivens-type actions.96 The
Ninth Circuit, however, has held that at least some constitutional
claims escape Feres.9 7
The Court in Bivens indicated two situations that might preclude implying a cause of action directly under the Constitution.
89. Id.
90. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2234 (1982) (Jaffee II); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F.
Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979); Misko v.United States, 453 F.
Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Bailey v.
DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967) (Feres immunizes
an army doctor in a common law negligence action).
91. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
U.S. CONST.
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
amend. IV.
92. See generally Lehmann, Bivens and Its Progeny: The Scope of a ConstitutionalCause
ofActionfor Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531 (1977).
93. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). "No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
95. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("However desirable a direct remedy against the Government might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the
sovereign still remains immune to suit."). See also Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (Jaffee I); Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850
(2d Cir. 1976).
96. See cases cited supra note 88.
97. See Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 292
(1982) (a racial discrimination suit based, in part, on the fifth amendment). See also Stanley
v. C.I.A., 639 F.2d at 1159 (negligence action dismissed, though court noted in dicta that
there is a "colorable constitutional claim" based on Bivens).
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The first situation would involve the existence of "special factors
counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."98 The second situation would exist when Congress had expressly provided for an alternate remedy.99 In Jaffee II,10 the
Third Circuit reviewed this standard along with the policy considerations underlying the Feres doctrine and concluded that Feres does
limit the Bivens remedy.
The application of the Feres doctrine to claims by the family of
military personnel raises additional questions.''
In Monaco v.
UnitedStates,102 the Ninth Circuit dealt with a claim by a child with
a birth defect allegedly caused by the in-service exposure of her father to radiation. The court held that since the child's injury had its
"genesis" in the injury of the father, it was similarly barred by the
Feres doctrine. 0 3 The majority of the courts that have decided the
issue are in accord with Monaco .
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis of Laswell with a discussion of the FTCA claims. The court first noted that Laswell's exposure to radiation was incident to service. Laswell was on active duty
and was participating in military operations at the time of the
exposure.
The court rejected with little discussion the plaintiffs' argument
that Feres does not apply to intentional torts. "The purposes for
which Feres was created and continues to exist are equally advanced regardless of whether a simple negligence case is presented
or the allegations constitute a more willful act."'0 5
The post-discharge claims proved more difficult. The plaintiffs'
contention was that the failure to warn Laswell and his family of the
health hazards they faced and the failure to provide preventive
treatment were post-discharge acts or omissions which are cognizable under the FTCA on the authority of United States v. Brown."
98. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.

99. Id. at 397.
100. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2234 (1982).
101. See generally Note, The Effect of the Feres Doctrine on Tori Actions Against the
UnitedStates by Family Members of Servicemen, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1241 (1982). Derivative suits, such as wrongful death actions, are clearly subject to the Feres doctrine since
Feres itself involved two wrongful death claims.
102. 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2269 (1982).
103. Id. at 133.
104. See Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3086 (1983); Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). But see
Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
105. Laswell, 683 F.2d at 265.
106. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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The court reviewed the decisions of Thornwell v. United States 10 7
and Everett v. United States108 and concluded these decisions were
not mandated by Brown since Brown involved an affirmative negligent act after discharge. The court characterized the failure to warn
or provide medical treatment as a mere omission which was, in effect, a continuation of the in-service tort.
The court seemed particularly concerned with the possible effects that the maintenance of such suits would have on military
planning and discipline. This is one of the major rationales supporting the Feres doctrine. In addition, the court was concerned that
such suits could result in creative pleadings that would undermine
that doctrine.
The plaintiffs' constitutional claims failed for two reasons.
First, the United States was not a proper defendant in a Bivens action. Second, the individually named defendants were improperly
joined. There was no allegation that they participated or acquiesced
in the alleged constitutional violations. The court, however, was
quick to point out that the result would be the same even if the
plaintiffs were to amend their complaint to name the correct defendants. The court extended the application of Feres to claims based
on constitutional grounds.
The claim of Laswell's children was dismissed because it was
based upon "the mere possibility of some future harm."'"
Increased risks of genetic damage will not sustain a lawsuit for personal injuries. Actual damage is required. The court also noted
that the negligent act took place during Laswell's military service.
This triggers the application of the Feres doctrine and operates to
bar the claims of the children also.
The court stated its awareness of the harsh results of its decision. However, it felt that the policy considerations involved necessitated congressional action to establish a remedy.
The importance of Laswell lies in its complete rejection of the
post-discharge claims. The Eighth Circuit has relieved the United
States of any affirmative duty to warn veterans of long-term health
risks resulting from their service. This is true despite the fact that
the government may be the only one in a position to know exactly
what health hazards the veteran was exposed to while in service.
Such claims, of course, have to be analyzed in light of the pol107. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
108. 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).

109. Laswell, 683 F.2d at 269.
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icy considerations underlying Feres. The most important of these
considerations is the effect the claim would have on military planning and discipline. Kelly v. United StatesII° was a case factually
similar to Laswell. In discussing the effect such claims would have
on the military, the district court asked, "[W]hat would be the consequence if military planners had found it necessary not to reveal
that nuclear testing had occurred, or the amount of radiation generated? Would not the duty urged by Kelly require such revelaThe Kelly court expressed legitimate concerns which
tion?""'1
should be considered to determine whether or not the United States
had an affirmative duty to warn.
It is this author's opinion that these concerns are not sufficient
to completely relieve the United States of a duty to warn veterans of
the health problems they will face as a result of their service. The
effect on military discipline of post-discharge failure to warn claims
seems to be minimal. Such claims would not involve the secondguessing of military orders. It would be unnecessary to determine if
the United States was negligent in exposing the veteran to the health
hazard in the first place. The facts underlying the in-service injury
would be relatively unimportant. ' 2 In addition, by their very nature, such claims would only arise after the claimant had left military service.
All that would be necessary for an adjudication of such claims
would be to 1) determine if the veteran had been exposed to a health
hazard; 2) determine if this was sufficient to create an affirmative
duty to warn; 3) determine if the United States breached its duty to
warn; and 4) determine if the breach caused the veteran's injury.
under the FTCA on the basis of
Such claims should be cognizable
' 3
United States v. Brown.
Denise Parsons

110.
111.
112.
113.

512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 361.
See Brown, 348 U.S. 110.
Id.

